Wednesday, August 31, 2011

FOUNDERS AND THEIR VIEW ON CHURCH AND STATE ALLIANCES

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ARTICLES & COMMENTARY:
TOC: The Rise of Church-State Alliances: Imperial Edicts & Church Councils between 306-565: Emperors Constantine through Justinian:
The Rise of Protestant Alliances of Church and State: Martin Luther and the German Reformation
The Rise of Protestant Alliances of Church and State: Ulrich Zwingli and the Swiss Reformation
The Constitution and the Commandments
The Classical Temple Architecture of Washington, DC
A History of Religious Tests: 312 to 1961
American Founders on Church-State Alliances
The Bible and the Quran: A Scriptural Comparison
Religion and Women's Suffrage
Religious Tradition and Interracial Marriages 
The Slaves of Jefferson and Washington and the 1782 Virginia Law of Manumission
Slavery and the Churches
Gays & Social Conservatism as a Coercive Tool of the State
Einstein's Religion
The Changing Religious Identification of America
Moral Hypocrisy in the Bible Belt
Ring Species, Evolution and why Intelligent Design isn't science.
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INFO & EYE OPENERS FROM OTHERS:
Court Holdings on Church and State
Historical Revisionism: On David Barton's Christian Nation
Biblical Archeology Review Special: Captivity, Exodus, and Conquest
Sexual Orientation in Nature
The Biological Basis of Morality by Edward O. Wilson
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FOUNDERS OF THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT
THOMAS JEFFERSON QUOTES
Thomas Jefferson Letters
ON JESUS THE MAN AND MORALIST
"But the greatest of all the reformers of the depraved religion of his own country, was Jesus of Nazareth. Abstracting what is really his from the rubbish in which it is buried, easily distinguished by its lustre from the dross of his biographers, and as separable from that as the diamond from the dunghill, we have the outlines of a system of the most sublime morality which has ever fallen from the lips of man; outlines which it is lamentable he did not live to fill up.
Epictetus and Epicurus give laws for governing ourselves, Jesus a supplement of the duties and charities we owe to others. The establishment of the innocent and genuine character of this benevolent moralist, and the rescuing it from the imputation of imposture, which has resulted from artificial systems, e. g. The immaculate conception of Jesus, his deification, the creation of the world by him, his miraculous powers, his resurrection and visible ascension, his corporeal presence in the Eucharist, the Trinity; original sin, atonement, regeneration, election, orders of Hierarchy, &c, invented by ultra-Christian sects, unauthorized by a single word ever uttered by him, is a most desirable object, and one to which Priestley has successfully devoted his labors and learning.
It would in time, it is to be hoped, effect a quiet euthanasia of the heresies of bigotry and fanaticism which have so long triumphed over human reason, and so generally and deeply afflicted mankind; but this work is to be begun by winnowing the grain from the chaff of the historians of his life. -- Letter William Short, with a Syllabus Monticello, October 31, 1819 http://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/P/tj3/writings/brf/jefl259.htm
JEFFERSON THE MATERIALIST:
"It is not to be understood that I am with him (Jesus Christ) in all his doctrines. I am a Materialist; he takes the side of Spiritualism; he preaches the efficacy of repentence toward forgiveness of sin; I require a counterpoise of good works to redeem it. Among the sayings and discourses imputed to him by his biographers, I find many passages of fine imagination, correct morality, and of the most lovely benevolence; and others, again, of so much ignorance, so much absurdity, so much untruth, charlatanism and imposture, as to pronounce it impossible that such contradictions should have proceeded from the same being. I separate, therefore, the gold from the dross; restore him to the former, and leave the latter to the stupidity of some, the roguery of others of his disciples. Of this band of dupes and imposters, Paul was the great Coryphaeus, and the first corruptor of the doctrines of Jesus." --- Letter to William Short, 1820
THE CLERGY, CHURCH & STATE
"And let us reflect that, having banished from our land that religious intolerance under which mankind so long bled and suffered, we have yet gained little if we countenance a political intolerance as despotic, as wicked, and capable of as bitter and bloody persecutions. Thomas Jefferson, "First Inaugural Address," March 4, 1801
"The clergy, by getting themselves established by law and ingrafted into the machine of government, have been a very formidable engine against the civil and religious rights of man. Letter to J. Moor, 1800
In every country and every age, the priest has been hostile to liberty. He is always in alliance with the despot, abetting his abuses in return for protection to his own. --Letter to Horatio Spofford, 1814
"I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit the free exercise thereof, thus building a wall of separation between church and state. Letter to the Baptists of Danbury, Connecticut, 1802.
"That but a short time elapsed after the death of the great reformer of the Jewish religion before his principles were departed from by those who professed to be his special servants, and perverted into an engine for enslaving mankind, and aggrandizing their oppressors in church and state: that the purest system of morals ever before preached to man has been adulterated and sophisticated, by artificial constructions, into a mere contrivance to filch wealth and power to themselves, that rational men not being able to swallow their impious heresies, in order to force them down their throats, they raise the hue and cry of infidelity, while themselves are the greatest obstacles to the advancement of the real doctrines of Jesus, and do in fact constitute the real Anti-Christ. -- Letter to William Baldwin, January 19, 1810
"Turning, then, from this loathsome combination of church and state, and weeping over the follies of our fellow men, who yield themselves the willing dupes and drudges of these mountebanks, I consider reformation and redress as desperate, and abandon them to the Quixotism of more enthusiastic minds." Letter to Charles Clay, January 29, 1815;
"I concur with you strictly in your opinion of the comparative merits of atheism and demonism, and really see nothing but the latter in the being worshipped by many who think themselves Christians." Letter to Richard Price, Jan. 8, 1789
"I never submitted the whole system of my opinions to the creed of any party of men whatever in religion, in philosophy, in politics, or in anything else where I was capable of thinking for myself. Such an addiction is the last degradation of a free and moral agent." Lletter to Francis Hopkinson, March 13, 1789
"They [the clergy] believe that any portion of power confided to me, will be exerted in opposition to their schemes. And they believe rightly; for I have sworn upon the altar of god, eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man. But this is all they have to fear from me: and enough, too, in their opinion."` -Letter to Dr. Benjamin Rush, Sept. 23, 1800
"History, I believe, furnishes no example of a priest-ridden people maintaining a free civil government. This marks the lowest grade of ignorance of which their civil as well as religious leaders will always avail themselves for their own purposes." Letter to Alexander von Humboldt, Dec. 6, 1813.
Speaking of the Gospels, Jefferson writes:
"The whole history of these books is so defective and doubtful that it seems vain to attempt minute enquiry into it: and such tricks have been played with their text, and with the texts of other books relating to them, that we have a right, from that cause, to entertain much doubt what parts of them are genuine. In the New Testament there is internal evidence that parts of it have proceeded from an extraordinary man; and that other parts are of the fabric of very inferior minds. It is as easy to separate those parts, as to pick out diamonds from dunghills." Letter to John Adams, January 24, 1814
"Christianity neither is, nor ever was a part of the common law." Letter to Dr. Thomas Cooper, February 10, 1814
"You say you are a Calvinist. I am not. I am of a sect by myself, as far as I know." Letter to Ezra Stiles Ely, June 25, 1819
"Man once surrendering his reason, has no remaining guard against absurdities the most monstrous, and like a ship without rudder, is the sport of every wind." Letter to James Smith, 1822.
"And the day will come when the mystical generation of Jesus, by the supreme being as his father in the womb of a virgin will be classed with the fable of the generation of Minerve in the brain of Jupiter. But may we hope that the dawn of reason and freedom of thought in these United States will do away with this artificial scaffolding, and restore to us the primitive and genuine doctrines of this most venerated reformer of human errors." Letter to John Adams, April 11, 1823
Proposing the end of estblished religion and religious tests a decade before the US Constitution, Jefferson proposed,
"All persons shall have full and free liberty of religious opinion; ...nor shall any man be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship place or ministry whatsoever or shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief, but all men shall be free to profess and by argument to maintain, their opinions in matters of religion, and that the same shall in no wise...affect their civil capacities." --Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom (Drafted 1779, passed 1786)
"Difference of opinion is advantageous in religion. The several sects perform the office of a common censor over each other. Is uniformity attainable? Millions of innocent men, women and children, since the introduction of Christianity, have been burnt, tortured, fined, imprisoned; yet we have not advanced one inch towards uniformity. What has been the effect of coercion? To make one half the world fools, and the other half hypocrites. To support roguery and error all over the earth." -- Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, 1781-82
"... I am not afraid of priests. They have tried upon me all their various batteries of pious whining, hypocritical canting, lying and slandering. I have contemplated their order from the Magi of the East to the Saints of the West and I have found no difference of character, but of more or less caution, in proportion to their information or ignorance on whom their interested duperies were to be played off. Their sway in New England is indeed formidable. No mind beyond mediocrity dares there to develop itself." --Letter to Horatio Spafford, 1816
"Shake off all the fears of servile prejudices, under which weak minds are servilely crouched. Fix reason firmly in her seat, and call on her tribunal for every fact, every opinion. Question with boldness even the existence of a God; because, if there be one, he must more approve of the homage of reason than that of blind faith." --Letter to his nephew Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787)
"Among the sayings and discourses imputed to him by his biographers, I find many passages of fine imagination, correct morality, and of the most lovely benevolence; and others, again, of so much ignorance, so much absurdity, so much untruth, charlatanism and imposture, as to pronounce it impossible that such contradictions should have proceeded from the same being. I separate, therefore, the gold from the dross; restore him to the former, and leave the latter to the stupidity of some, the roguery of others of his disciples. Of this band of dupes and imposters, Paul was the great Coryphaeus, and first corruptor of the doctrines of Jesus." --Letter to William Short (Apr. 13, 1820)
"...If we did a good act merely from the love of God and a belief that is pleasing to him, whence arises the morality of the Atheist? It is idle to say, as some do, that no such thing exists. We have the same evidence of the fact as of most of those we act on, to wit: their own affirmations, and their reasonings in support of them. I have observed, indeed, generally, that while in Protestant countries the defections from the Platonic Christianity of the priests is to Deism, in Catholic countries they are to Atheism. Diderot, D'Alembert, D'Holbach, Condorcet, are known to have been among the most virtuous of men. Their virtue, then, must have had some other foundation than love of God." --Letter to Thomas Law June 13, 1814
Speaking of the Book of Revelations:
"It is between fifty and sixty years since I read it, and I then considered it merely the ravings of a maniac, no more worthy nor capable of explanation than the incoherences of our own nightly dreams." Letter to General Alexander Smyth, Jan. 17, 1825
JAMES MADISON STATEMENTS
The civil Government, though bereft of everything like an associated hierarchy, possesses the requisite stability, and performs its functions with complete success, whilst the number, the industry, and the morality of the priesthood, and the devotion of the people, have been manifestly increased by the total separation of the church from the State (Letter to Robert Walsh, Mar. 2, 1819).
Strongly guarded as is the separation between religion and & Gov't in the Constitution of the United States the danger of encroachment by Ecclesiastical Bodies, may be illustrated by precedents already furnished in their short history (Detached Memoranda, circa 1820).
I must admit moreover that it may not be easy, in every possible case, to trace the line of separation between the rights of religion and the civil authority with such distinctness as to avoid collisions and doubts on unessential points. The tendency to a usurpation on one side or the other or to a corrupting coalition or alliance between them will be best guarded against by entire abstinence of the government from interference in any way whatever, beyond the necessity of preserving public order and protecting each sect against trespasses on its legal rights by others. (Letter Rev. Jasper Adams, Spring 1832).
To the Baptist Churches on Neal's Greek on Black Creek, North Carolina I have received, fellow-citizens, your address, approving my objection to the Bill containing a grant of public land to the Baptist Church at Salem Meeting House, Mississippi Territory. Having always regarded the practical distinction between Religion and Civil Government as essential to the purity of both, and as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, I could not have otherwise discharged my duty on the occasion which presented itself (Letter to Baptist Churches in North Carolina, June 3, 1811).
The experience of the United States is a happy disproof of the error so long rooted in the unenlightened minds of well-meaning Christians, as well as in the corrupt hearts of persecuting usurpers, that without a legal incorporation of religious and civil polity, neither could be supported. A mutual independence is found most friendly to practical Religion, to social harmony, and to political prosperity (Letter to F.L. Schaeffer, Dec 3, 1821).


Letter to Edward Livingston, July 10, 1822:
"Notwithstanding the general progress made within the two last centuries in favour of this branch of liberty, and the full establishment of it in some parts of our country, there remains in others a strong bias towards the old error, that without some sort of alliance or coalition between Government and Religion neither can be duly supported. Such, indeed, is the tendency to such a coalition, and such its corrupting influence on both the parties, that the danger cannot be too carefully guarded against. And in a Government of opinion like ours, the only effectual guard must be found in the soundness and stability of the general opinion on the subject. Every new and successful example, therefore, of a perfect separation between the ecclesiastical and civil matters, is of importance; and I have no doubt that every new example will succeed, as every past one has done, in showing that religion and Government will both exist in greater purity the less they are mixed together."
"It was the belief of all sects at one time that the establishment of Religion by law was right and necessary; that the true religion ought to be established in exclusion of every other; and that the only question to be decided was, which was the true religion. The example of Holland proved that a toleration of sects dissenting from the established sect was safe, and even useful. The example of the colonies, now States, which rejected religious establishments altogether, proved that all sects might be safely and even advantageously put on a footing of equal and entire freedom; and a continuance of their example since the Declaration of Independence has shown that its success in Colonies was not to be ascribed to their connection with the parent country. if a further confirmation of the truth could be wanted, it is to be found in the examples furnished by the States which had abolished their religious establishments."
"I cannot speak particularly of any of the cases excepting that of Virginia, where it is impossible to deny that religion prevails with more zeal and a more exemplary priesthood than it ever did when established and patronized by public authority. We are teaching the world the great truth, that Governments do better without kings and nobles than with them. The merit will be doubled by the other lesson: the Religion flourishes in greater purity without, than with the aid of Government


Letter to Rev. Jasper Adams, Spring 1832:
"The prevailing opinion in Europe, England not excepted, has been that religion could not be preserved without the support of government nor government be supported without an established religion that there must be at least an alliance of some sort between them. It remained for North America to bring the great and interesting subject to a fair, and finally a decisive test."
"It is true that the New England states have not discontinued establishments of religions formed under very peculiar circumstances; but they have by successive relaxations advanced toward the prevailing example; and without any evidence of disadvantage either to religion or good government."
But the existing character, distinguished as it is by its religious features, and the lapse of time now more than 50 years since the legal support of religion was withdrawn sufficiently proved that it does not need the support of government and it will scarcely be contended that government has suffered by the exemption of religion from its cognizance, or its pecuniary aid.


JOHN ADAMS STATEMENTS:
From "A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America" (1787)
"The United States of America have exhibited, perhaps, the first example of governments erected on the simple principles of nature; and if men are now sufficiently enlightened to disabuse themselves of artifice, imposture, hypocrisy, and superstition, they will consider this event as an era in their history. Although the detail of the formation of the American governments is at present little known or regarded either in Europe or in America, it may hereafter become an object of curiosity. It will never be pretended that any persons employed in that service had interviews with the gods, or were in any degree under the influence of Heaven, more than those at work upon ships or houses, or laboring in merchandise or agriculture; it will forever be acknowledged that these governments were contrived merely by the use of reason and the senses.
. . . Thirteen governments [of the original states] thus founded on the natural authority of the people alone, without a pretence of miracle or mystery, and which are destined to spread over the northern part of that whole quarter of the globe, are a great point gained in favor of the rights of mankind."


Note: Adams' book - A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America - can be found online in a variety of places. It has entire sections devoted on the governments of Greece and Rome, which were the intellectual and organizational models of the US Constitution. The US Constitution is in no way founded on the Christian religion or the 'Ten Commandments" (See commandments V Constitution link-page at top of this page) For the clincher see what the US Senate ratified below without contention.


ARTICLE 11, TREATY OF TRIPOLI - 1796-1797:
"As the government of the United States of America is not in any sense founded on the Christian Religion--as it has itself no character of enmity against the law, religion or tranquility of Musselmen [Muslims],...
"Now be it known, that I, John Adams, President of the United States of America, having seen and considered the said treaty do, by and within the consent of the Senate, accept, ratify and confirm the same, and every clause and article thereof."
"But how has it happened that millions of fables, tales, legends, have been blended with both Jewish and Christian revelation that have made them the most bloody religion that ever existed.--John Adams in a letter to F.A. Van der Kamp, Dec. 27, 1816,


John Adams letter to Thomas Jefferson, January 23, 1825:
"We think ourselves possessed, or, at least, we boast that we are so, of liberty of conscience on all subjects, and of the right of free inquiry and private judgment in all cases, and yet how far are we from these exalted privileges in fact! There exists, I believe, throughout the whole Christian world, a law which makes it blasphemy to deny or doubt the divine inspiration of all the books of the Old and New Testaments, from Genesis to Revelations. In most countries of Europe it is punished by fire at the stake, or the rack, or the wheel. In England itself it is punished by boring through the tongue with a red-hot poker. In America it is not better; even in our own Massachusetts, which I believe, upon the whole, is as temperate and moderate in religious zeal as most of the States, a law was made in the latter end of the last century, repealing the cruel punishments of the former laws, but substituting fine and imprisonment upon all those blasphemers upon any book of the Old Testament or New."
"Now, what free inquiry, when a writer must surely encounter the risk of fine or imprisonment for adducing any argument for investigating into the divine authority of those books? Who would run the risk of translating Dupuis? But I cannot enlarge upon this subject, though I have it much at heart. I think such laws a great embarrassment, great obstructions to the improvement of the human mind. Books that cannot bear examination, certainly ought not to be established as divine inspiration by penal laws. It is true, few persons appear desirous to put such laws in execution, and it is also true that some few persons are hardy enough to venture to depart from them. But as long as they continue in force as laws, the human mind must make an awkward and clumsy progress in its investigations. I wish they were repealed.
"The substance and essence of Christianity, as I understand it, is eternal and unchangeable, and will bear examination forever, but it has been mixed with extraneous ingredients, which I think will not bear examination, and they ought to be separated. Adieu."
THOMAS PAINE: Rights of Man:
From Part 1
The French Constitution hath abolished or renounced toleration, and intolerance also, and hath established UNIVERSAL RIGHT OF CONSCIENCE.
Toleration is not the opposite of intoleration, but is the counterfeit of it. Both are despotisms. The one assumes to itself the right of withholding liberty of conscience, and the other of granting it. The one is the Pope, armed with fire and faggot, and the other is the Pope selling or granting indulgences. The former is church and state, and the latter is church and traffic.
But toleration may be viewed in a much stronger light. Man worships not himself, but his Maker: and the liberty of conscience which he claims, is not for the service of himself, but of his God. In this case, therefore, we must necessarily have the associated idea of two beings; the mortal who renders the worship, and the immortal being who is worshipped.
Toleration therefore, places itself not between man and man, nor between church and church, nor between one denomination of religion and another, but between God and man; between the being who worships, and the being who is worshipped; and by the same act of assumed authority by which it tolerates man to pay his worship, it presumptuously and blasphemously sets up itself to tolerate the Almighty to receive it.
Were a bill brought into Parliament, entitled, "An act to tolerate or grant liberty to the Almighty to receive the worship of a Jew or a Turk," or "to prohibit the Almighty from receiving it," all men would startle, and call it blasphemy. There would be an uproar. The presumption of toleration in religious matters would then, present itself unmasked; but the presumption is not the less because the name of "Man" only appears to those laws, for the associated idea of the worshipper and the worshipped cannot be separated.
Who, then, art thou, vain dust and ashes! by whatever name thou art called, whether a king, a bishop, a church or a state, a parliament or any thing else, that obtrudest thine insignificance between the soul of man and his Maker? Mind thine own concerns. If he believes not as thou believest, it is a proof that thou believest not as he believeth, and there is no earthly power can determine between you.
With respect to what are called denominations of religion, if every one is left to judge of his own religion, there is no such thing as a religion that is wrong; but if they are to judge of each other's religion, there is no such thing as a religion that is right; and therefore all the world is right, or all the world is wrong.
But with respect to religion itself, without regard to names, and as directing itself from the universal family of mankind to the divine object of all adoration, it is man bringing to his Maker the fruits of his heart; and though these fruits may differ from each other like the fruits of the earth, the grateful tribute of every one is accepted.
A bishop of Durham, or a bishop of Winchester, or the archbishop who heads the dukes, will not refuse a tithesheaf of wheat, because it is not a cock of hay; nor a cock of hay, because it is not a sheaf of wheat; nor a pig, because it is neither the one nor the other: but these same persons, under the figure of an established church, will not permit their Maker to receive the various tithes of man's devotion.
One of the continual choruses of Mr. Burke's book, is "church and state." He does not mean some one particular church, or some one particular state, but any church and state; and he uses the term as a general figure to hold forth the political doctrine of always uniting the church with the state in every country, and he censures the National Assembly for not having done this in France. Let us bestow a few thoughts on this subject.
All religions are in their nature mild and benign, and united with principles of morality. They could not have made proselytes at first, by professing anything that was vicious, cruel, persecuting or immoral. Like every thing else, they had their beginning; and they proceeded by persuasion, exhortation, and example. How then is it that they lose their native mildness, and become morose and intolerant?
It proceeds from the connection which Mr. Burke recommends. By engendering the church with the state, a sort of mule-animal, capable only of destroying, and not of breeding up, is produced, called, The Church established by Law. It is a stranger, even from its birth to any parent mother on which it is begotten, and whom in time it kicks out and destroys.
The Inquisition in Spain does not proceed from the religion originally professed, but from this mule-animal, engendered between the church and the state. The burnings in Smithfield proceeded from the same heterogeneous production; and it was the regeneration of this strange animal in England afterwards, that renewed rancor and irreligion among the inhabitants, and that drove the people called Quakers and Dissenters to America.
Persecution is not an original feature in any religion; but it is always the strongly marked feature of all law-religions, or religions established by law. Take away the law-establishment, and every religion reassumes its original benignity. In America, a Catholic priest is a good citizen, a good character, and a good neighbor; an Episcopal minister is of the same description: and this proceeds, independently of the men, from there being no law-establishment in America.
If also we view this matter in a temporal sense, we shall see the ill effects it has had on the prosperity of nations. The union of church and state has impoverished Spain. The revoking the edict of Nantes drove the silk manufacture from France into England; and church and state are now driving the cotton manufacture from England to America and France.
Let then Mr. Burke continue to preach his anti-political doctrine of Church and State. It will do some good. The National Assembly will not follow his advice, but will benefit by his folly. It was by observing the ill effects of it in England, that America has been warned against it; and it is by experiencing them in France, that the National Assembly have abolished it, and, like America, have established UNIVERSAL RIGHT OF CONSCIENCE, AND UNIVERSAL RIGHT OF CITIZENSHIP.


CHIEF JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: Commentaries on the Constitution: On Article 6, Clause 3
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a6_3s27.html
Excerpt:
"The remaining part of the clause declares, that "no religious test shall ever be required, as a qualification to any office or public trust, under the United States." This clause is not introduced merely for the purpose of satisfying the scruples of many respectable persons, who feel an invincible repugnance to any religious test, or affirmation. It had a higher object; to cut off for ever every pretence of any alliance between church and state in the national government. The framers of the constitution were fully sensible of the dangers from this source, marked out in the history of other ages and countries; and not wholly unknown to our own. They knew, that bigotry was unceasingly vigilant in its stratagems, to secure to itself an exclusive ascendancy over the human mind; and that intolerance was ever ready to arm itself with all the terrors of the civil power to exterminate those, who doubted its dogmas, or resisted its infallibility. The Catholic and the Protestant had alternately waged the most ferocious and unrelenting warfare on each other; and Protestantism itself, at the very moment, that it was proclaiming the right of private judgment, prescribed boundaries to that right, beyond which if any one dared to pass, he must seal his rashness with the blood of martyrdom."

IMAM GLEN BECK AND AYATOLLAH BRYAN FISCHER ARE IGNORANT ON WHAT FASCISM IS


Letter To the Laconia Daily Sun: Historical Revisionism of the Right with a new dictionary

The right has a bad habit of revising history and Glenda Beckster revises both history and accepted definitions. It is difficult to classify people politically on a linear scale so even our current labels have a lot to be desired. In our political climate, far left means heavy handed socialist government and far right means heavy handed conservative government. Few see left vs right as "from big government to no government" although it could be true on another planet or with a non-linear model.
Glenda Beckster and others like to throw around the word socialist indiscriminately. Socialism is when the government owns the companies of its nation. Seen that lately? Probably not. Venezuela for sure. Fascism on the other hand involves a corrupt marriage between big business and government. Corporate power and outcomes drive government decisions. Mussolini said "Fascism should more properly be called corporatism because it is the merger of state and corporate power". Sound familiar? Citizens United ruling? The Koch brothers buying our politicians? Corporations are people?
Mr Hood claims Mussolini was a socialist. He was until after WWI but renounced socialism in favor of his fascism that emphasized militant patriotic nationalism. Ring a bell? I doubt Mr. Hood has read Mussolini's encyclopedic declaration written in 1932 because if he did, he would know that Mussolini relentlessly attacked liberalism and socialism. I urge him to read it at http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/reading/germany/mussolini.htm. In his manifesto he mentions liberalism and socialism in a negative way 43 times. In contrast to the materialism of socialism, Mussolini claims Fascism is spiritual and uses the term 23 times to define Fascism. Materialism and spiritualism are opposites, by the way. Socialism is concerned with the proletariat, fascism is concerned with the state. But certainly, people are easily confused because no political ideology holds completely unique beliefs.
Mr. Hood said in his letter "Liberals do love to associate conservatives with Nazis but since facts might muddle the charge they never offer any". You want facts? Okay, lets look at the facts.
In 1920 and 1921 the Italian streets were filled with protesting workers. The Italian fascist "blackshirts" were used to crush socialism in any way, disrupting their meetings and committing violence in the streets. Mussolini took advantage of the situation by forming alliances with industrial giants and finally forcing trade unions to crumble and socialists mayors to resign. In 1927, Mussolini gave some rights back to unions as long as they were state or party controlled. Hey, Scott Walker!
In 1933, when Hitler gained dictatorial powers with the "Enabling Act", he abolished labor unions and replaced them with the Nazi Party's "Labor Front". Trade unions were socialist and Hitler, like Mussolini and Franco, hated socialism. Mussolini abolished trade unions, too. Sound familiar? Hitler used "law and order" to destroy individual rights. Fascists ended collective bargaining rights. Together, Mussolini, Hitler and Franco arrested hundreds of thousands of communists, socialists and democratic socialists because socialism was the enemy of fascism.
Hitler's fascism emphasized "real Germans" like our right wingers emphasize "real Americans". Fascists supported laws that would attack any cultural diversity in the press, the arts or radio in Germany. They thought any foreign cultural influence would strip Germany of its soul, so they mounted a cultural war just as our right wingers do. Liberal professors were targeted. Any use of a non-German language was unpatriotic. Note the vehemence of the English-only crowd.
German Fascism was vehemently anti-immigrant. Mussolini declared universal suffrage was the greatest of lies. If you follow America's right wing you will notice the harsh anti-immigrant rants. Conservatives also have a long history of opposing universal suffrage from religious equality, abolition and women's suffrage, to child labor laws, reproductive freedom and gay rights.
In 1936 Hitler and Heinrich Himmler created the bureaucracy, THE REICH OFFICE FOR THE COMBATING OF HOMOSEXUALITY AND ABORTION. The Reich, as soon as it was empowered by dictatorial powers raided every gay business in the nation and shut their doors. Between 1936 and 1939, 100,000 gay men were imprisoned at one time or another. A Tea Party dream I'd say. What remains of records from concentration camps like Buchenwald evidence the gassing of at least 15,000 gay men. In his speeches, Himmler bragged about pretending to allow gays to escape the camps so they could kill them. In the camps certain doctors were tasked with finding a way to cure gays. One way was to force them to have sex with prostitutes. Straight porn, too, 


Homosexuals that found themselves in the concentration camps at Buchenwald and Neuengamme were experimented upon by the Danish SS doctor, Carl Vaernet. The SS gave him a research position, a staff, laboratories, financial support, and camp inmates with which to experiment upon. His treatments included castration for the incurable, and hormones for the others. Under the Nazi doctrine of re-education, Vaernet had developed a hormone implant for homosexuals.
Ring any bells yet?
Fascism was about family values! Contraception and/or abortion were outlawed by Mussolini, Hitler and Franco. Family planning clinics disappeared. Hitler awarded women with the the Motherhood Cross who had given birth to the largest number of children. Lesser Medals were the Golden Cross for eight children, the Silver Cross for six children, and a Bronze for those who had four children. Four kids! Shanmeful! Mussolini's government paid extra benefits to the exceptionally reproductive! Are you catching on yet? Women were supposed to be the helpmates and babymakers of men. Before Hitler came into power there were 100,000 female teachers but that ended with Hitler's rise to power. Women went home until so many of the men were killed they had to go back to work.
If it walks like a goose, its probably a goose.

TREATY OF TRIPOLI: OUR GOVERNMENT IS NOT FOUNDED ON THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

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ARTICLES & COMMENTARY:
TOC: The Rise of Church-State Alliances: Imperial Edicts & Church Councils between 306-565: Emperors Constantine through Justinian:
The Rise of Protestant Alliances of Church and State: Martin Luther and the German Reformation
The Rise of Protestant Alliances of Church and State: Ulrich Zwingli and the Swiss Reformation
The Constitution and the Commandments
The Classical Temple Architecture of Washington, DC
A History of Religious Tests: 312 to 1961
American Founders on Church-State Alliances
The Bible and the Quran: A Scriptural Comparison
Religion and Women's Suffrage
Religious Tradition and Interracial Marriages The Slaves of Jefferson and Washington and the 1782 Virginia Law of Manumission
Slavery and the Churches
Gays & Social Conservatism as a Coercive Tool of the State
Einstein's Religion
The Changing Religious Identification of America
Moral Hypocrisy in the Bible Belt
Ring Species, Evolution and why Intelligent Design isn't science.
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Court Holdings on Church and State
Historical Revisionism: On David Barton's Christian Nation
Biblical Archeology Review Special: Captivity, Exodus, and Conquest
Sexual Orientation in Nature
The Biological Basis of Morality by Edward O. Wilson
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THE TREATY OF TRIPOLI OF 1797

Legally, is the United States a Christian Nation?

In 1797 the United States Senate ratified the Treaty of Tripoli which involved making peace with the Barbary Coast of North Africa (Morocco to Libya). The treaty specifically notes the religious character of the Barbary peoples as Muslim. It was ratified by the full Senate - unanimously. This is important because by this ratification it is clear that the President and the Senate of the founding era, of the American Enlightenment, had a very different philosophical view of our foundation than Christian conservatives generally do.


Article 11 of the treaty reads:

"As the government of the United States of America is not in any sense founded on the Christian religion -- as it has itself no character of enmity against the law, religion or tranquility of Musselmen, and as the said states never have entered into an war or act of hostility against any Mohametan nation, it is declared by the parties, that no pretext arising from religious opinions shall ever produce."


Not in any sense founded on the Christian religion. No pretext arising from any religious opinion. This is strong stuff that directly contradicts the voices of the far right. Why would the President of the United States and a unanimous Senate say such a thing if it were not true? In the alternate universe of the religious right's Senate chamber of 1797, Christian voices would raise a clamoring charge that this was not so! But the legally Christian nation was not fact to the founding generation that ratified this treaty; every senator ratified the entire treaty. A large part of the answer to this apparent contradiction to the Christian nation doctrine lies in the prevalence of enlightenment thought in the intellectual circles of both Europe and America. The enlightenment was all the rage in coastal, educated America, complete with an abundance of classical and renaissance literature, Newtonian science, and a sprinkling of deism. Like the Reformation period, which sprang from the the liberal nature of the renaissance period, the enlightenment was a political, scientific, and cultural revolution that changed all of western society.

It is important to notice that Article 11 of the Treaty isn't speaking of heritage, tradition, or culture; it is speaking of the government of the United States. That government, with all its codes and statutes, from the smallest town to the federal government, must be pursuant to the Constitution, a clearly secular and non-religious document. It is not anti-religion or pro-religion; it is religion-neutral. So now, what is the place of treaties in the Constitution? This is set down in no uncertain terms, as are the limits on states rights, in Article 6, Section 2. The section reads:

"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."


Even if one is to dispute any high place for treaties under the Constitution, it is hard to dismiss what the United States Senators and the President agreed that the Government of the United States was not in any sense founded on the Christian religion. And it would be a false premise because if one looks at the Federalist Papers, the Anti-Federalist Papers, and the state ratification conventions after the signing of the Constitution in Philadelphia, you will notice that this was an issue that was debated in regards to the power of the Senate. Many did complain but in the end the Senate's authority in matters of treaties was ratified by all the parties.

The Treaty was read aloud on the floor and published for all the Senators and every one voted in the affirmative. The treaty was signed into law by President John Adams only six years after the ratification of the Bill of Rights. The treaty testifies unequivocally against the historical revisionists. Here is President John Adams final say on the treaty:

"Now be it known, that I, John Adams, President of the United States of America, having seen and considered the said treaty do, by and within the consent of the Senate, accept, ratify and confirm the same, and every clause and article thereof."


Every clause and article. The separation of church and state is not a myth and invention of liberals, n onbelievers and activist judges in the 1960s as some claim. Note this ruling by the United States Supreme Court in an 1860 case, Melvin V. Easley.

"Christianity is not established by law, and the genius of our institutions requires that the Church and the State should be kept separate....The state confesses its incompetency to judge spiritual matters between men or between man and his maker ... spiritual matters are exclusively in the hands of teachers of religion".
20

Just who were these men of the United States Senate who unanimously voted that the government of the United States was not in any sense founded on the Christian religion? David Barton and his Wallbuilders yahoos like to act as if the founders supported the concept of the Christian Nation but their arguments are based in their own wishful, evangelical thinking. Fundamentalist Christians project their own beliefs on to founders as if these founders were the same type of Christians as them. Most were sons of the Enlightenment. The right wing cites lots of quotes and the fact that they were members of churches but as we know, present day Christians of the progressive and liberal persuasion, clergy and laity, strongly support the separation of church and state. It is clear by the Senate's ratification of this entire treaty that they believed the government of the United States is not a Christian one. So who were these men? Were they lesser men than the signers of the Declaration, the Articles of Confederation and the Federal Constitution? I think you will be surprised. As it was with the founding fathers were are most familiar with, these were not ordinary men.

Here was have some of the most important men in our founding generation, including the founding fathers of state:

A wealthy and influential shipping merchant from Portsmouth, John Langdon served as the US Senator for the State of New Hampshire from April 6, 1789 to March 4, 1801. He was a signer of the United States Constitution in Philadelphia and became New Hampshire's first US Senator. He was the very first President Pro Tempore of the United States Senate. This position in the Senate is the highest rank other than the Vice President of the United States who is the President of the Senate. As a supporter of the revolution he served in the forces that seized the British munitions at Fort William and Mary in 1774 and was New Hampshire's delegate in the First Continental Congress of 1775-1776. After that he superintended the building at least three warships for the Continental forces, fought at the Battles of Bennington and Rhode Island, and commanded Langdon's Company of Light Horse Volunteers at the Battle of Saratoga. Before and after his tenure in the US Senate he was the Governor of NH. He also served several years in the NH Legislature. He was probably a member of the Congregationalist Church.

The son of a judge, Senator Theodore Foster was the first United States Senator for the State of Rhode Island. He served from June 7, 1790 to March 4, 1803. Foster was classically educated at the College in the English Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, which became Brown University. As the protégé of Stephen Hopkins, Brown's first chancellor, Chief Justice of Rhode Island, and signer of the Declaration of Independence, he studied law and became a lawyer. He served in the Rhode Island legislature, the state's Council of War, and was a judge in the court of admiralty while a naval officer. As a naval officer, he played a part in the Gaspee Affair, a naval chase incident in 1772 which involved attacking, looting and destroying the HMS Gaspee after it ran aground while enforcing extremely unpopular trade regulations against the colonies.

Foster was a strong supporter of the Federalist cause of Washington, Hamilton and Madison and backed his state's ratification of the federal Constitution. See also Theodore Foster's minutes of the convention held at South Kingstown in March of 1790 which failed to adopt the Constitution at Google books. After his terms in the US Senate, he returned to the state legislature from 1812 to 1816. His religion is unknown.
5 New Jersey's Senator at the time was the Federalist John Rutherfurd. His tenure at the Senate lasted from March 4, 1791 to December 5, 1798. He was New Jersey's second US Senator. He studied law at Princeton and began his practice in New York City. Returning to New Jersey, he was served in the New Jersey general Assembly 1788-1790. Rutherfurd also served as a Presidential Elector in 1788. He was then elected to the US Senate. After his service in the US Senate, Rutherfurd remained very active in New Jersey politics. His religion is unknown but he was buried in his family vault at Christ Church Cemetery in Belleville, NJ.

The Democratic-Republican Senator from Kentucky in the Fifth Congress was a US Representative for Virginia in the First and Second Congress. Senator John Brown is known as the Founding Father of the fourteenth state, Kentucky. As a representative of Virginia in the infancy of the United States', it was John Brown who introduced the Bill which led to Kentucky statehood. Virginia at the time included wide expanses of land that included Kentucky and West Virginia. They also laid claims to the northwest of there. When Kentucky became a State on June 1, 1792, John Brown was elected by Kentucky and served from June 18, 1792 to March 3, 1805. During the Eighth Congress he served as the Senate's President Pro Tempore.
John Brown was the son of Irish immigrants. His father was a Presbyterian preacher and a learned schoolmaster. First educated at Liberty Hall Academy (now Washington and Lee College), Brown began his collegiate studies at the College of New Jersey (Princeton) and furthered them by studying law at The College of William and Mary. Due to his years at Princeton and William and Mary being interrupted at times by British military intrusions, Brown served war until its end. After his studies at William and Mary, Brown taught for a while and then went on to study law and work in the law office of Thomas Jefferson. After being admitted to the bar, Brown moved to Frankfurt to build a practice. A community leader, he was elected by the Kentucky District in 1784 to serve in the Virginia State Senate. That body soon elected him to be the district of Kentucky's delegate to the Congress of the Confederation in 1787 and 1788. Under the nation's first ratified Constitution - called The Articles of Confederation, the Continental Congress became the Congress of the Confederation on March 1, 1781.

His Frankfurt, Kentucky home called Liberty Hall, is a National Historic Landmark.

William Bradford was the US Senator for the State of Rhode Island from March 4, 1793 to October of 1797. He was Senate President Pro Tempore of the Fifth Congress from July 6, 1797 until his resignation in October 1797 at the age of 68. Bradford was educated as a physician in Hingham, Massachusetts, then moved to Rhode Island where he began his practice. There he was elected to Rhode Island's colonial assembly in in 1761. Finding he preferred law and public service, he switched gears, began studying law, and was admitted to the bar in 1767 at the age of 38. Bradford served in the Rhode island legislature before and after his term in the US Senate until 1803. Bradford also served as Deputy Governor of Rhode Island during the initial years of the revolution and was elected to be the state's delegate to the Continental Congress in 1776 which he did not attend. His home was destroyed by the British naval bombardment of Bristol on October 7, 1775 after which he was part of the cease-fire negotiating aboard a British vessel.

New Hampshire's other US Senator was Samuel Livermore. Supporting Washington as a Federalist he served in the Senate from March 4, 1793 to his retirement on June 12, 1801. He was also the President Pro Tempore of the Senate during the Fourth and Sixth Congresses. Educated at the College of New Jersey (Princeton), he was admitted to the Bar in 1756. Dedicated to public service, he served in the New Hampshire Legislature, was a legal advocate in the Admiralty Court, and then became New Hampshire's Attorney General from 1769 to 1774. Elected to both the Continental Congress 1780-1782 and the Congress of the Confederation 1785-1786. He was at the same time the Chief Justice of the NH Superior Court from 1782 to 1789. Not one to slow down, he was also a delegate to New Hampshire's ratification convention of the federal Constitution in 1788.

After the ratification of the United States Constitution, New Hampshire elected Livermore to the US House of Representatives for the First and Second Congresses of the United States. serving from March 4, 1789 to March 4, 1793. There he was chairman of the House Committee on Elections in the Second Congress. At the same time he presided over NH's Constitutional Convention in 1791 & 1792. His grave is at Trinity Churchyard in Holderness.

The son of a Presbyterian minister, Senator Alexander Martin represented the state of North Carolina. He served from March 4, 1793 to March 4, 1799. As an anti-Federalist he opposed many of the Washington and Adams policies.

He received his education at The College of New Jersey / Princeton, being awarded a B.A. in 1756 and an M.A. in 1759. He moved to North Carolina around 1761 and became a Justice of the Peace, a practicing attorney, and a judge in Guilford County. The years 1773 and 1774 were spent as a representative in the State house of Commons. As the war neared, he then served in the provincial congress in 1775 and then as an officer in the Revolutionary War. After the war, he served in the North Carolina Senate during periods from 1778 to 1782, in 1785, and from 1787 to 1788. He was acting Governor in 1781 then the General Assembly elected him North Carolina Governor for three consecutive terms. In 1786 Martin was selected to be a delegate to the Confederation Congress but resigned without attending a session. He was also elected as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, but he left before the document was signed. The years of 1789, 1790, and 1791 found him thrice again in the Governor's chair.

A strong advocate for education like Jefferson, Martin served on the Board of Trustees of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill from 1790 until his death in 1807.

Delaware's Senator Henry Latimer wore more than one hat from the start. Son of a wealth merchant family, at the College of Philadelphia (now the University of Pennsylvania), he sought a strong classical liberal education and then studied medicine, graduating in 1773. He furthered his studies in medicine with a degree in 1775 from Edinburgh Medical College in Scotland. Returning home at a time when the revolution was commencing, he was appointed Surgeon General of the Northern Division of the Continental Army. He operated the "Flying Hospital", which was a mobile surgical unit that served outside battles whenever possible.
Latimer was elected to Continental Congress in Annapolis but never attended. Strongly Federalist, he served in Delaware House of Representatives from 1787 through the 1791 session. He was the Speaker of the House during the 1790-1791 session. At this time Latimer ran for the US House of Representatives and lost initially. Challenging the outcome, the Federalists in charge were able to disqualify enough votes to hand Latimer his victory over his opponent Patton. After being seated in the US House, he resigned after a year of service and his state legislature elected him to fill the US Senator seat vacated by George Read's resignation. He served from February 7, 1795 to February 28, 1801, when he resigned due to his frustration with the successes of his opponents, the Jeffersonian Democrati- Republicans. His constituents were increasingly Irish and Democratic-Republican and the never let him forget the "stolen election" and his negative attitude towards the laboring classes and the Irish. According to historians he said "the laboring classes lived too well to be happy and should be reduced to the fare of the Irish.". Catholic bigotry for sure.

Latimer was not one to lay down even if he did seem to leave many of his assignments unfinished. Latimer served at the highest levels of the Wilmington Academy board, the Bank of Delaware, the First Agricultural Society of New Castle County, and was the President of the Board of Trustees of Newark College. He was a charter member of the Delaware Medical Society. He died in Philadelphia on December 19, 1819; his grave is in his denomination's Presbyterian Cemetery of Wilmington, Delaware.

Pennsylvania's Federalist Senator William Bingham served from March 4, 1795 to March 4, 1801. Bingham graduated from the College of Philadelphia (University of PA) in 1768 and went into the trading and land development. He also founded the first bank in America, the Bank of North America. By the start of the revolution, he was considered the richest man in Philadelphia. During the war he was an agent then a consul in the West Indies for the Continental Congress. Bingham also had his hand in the Privateering business in which the government authorized private ships to attack foreign shipping. The strategy cost the government nothing and brought arms and goods into the Continental forces all the while profiting the private merchants.
After the war he was elected by Pennsylvania to represent it in the Congress of the Confederation from 1786 to 1788. He then served in the Pennsylvania House of Representatives in 1790 and 1791, and as its very first Speaker of the House in 1791. Bingham then made the jump to the State Senate from 1793 through 1794. Bingham was then elected to the US Senate by Pennsylvania's legislature to succeed Robert Morris, the wealthy man who is sometimes called the Financier of the American Revolution. Senator Bingham served from March 4, 1795 to March 4, 1801 and was President ProTtempore during the Fourth Congress but was not at all liked by the Jeffersonian politicians, who lambasted him for, "extravagance, ostentation and dissipation".

North Carolina's Senator Timothy Bloodworth served from March 4, 1795 to March 4, 1801. It can be said that he was not educated in any way similar to most of the other Senators. He rose from a 'jack of all trades' commoner from the country to a United States Senator by way of the strengths of his beliefs. He was one of the first working class politicians of his time. The North Carolina History Project states:

"Bloodworth had little formal education, but he pursued a variety of careers. He farmed, taught school, kept a tavern, and operated a ferry. At one point, he practiced medicine and preached occasionally. He also worked as a wheelwright and watchmaker, but he was probably best known as a blacksmith. Bloodworth’s many services to his neighbors won him a large following even if, in the words of nineteenth-century North Carolina historian Griffith McRee, his â€Å“learning was so ill-digested as sometimes to excite ridicule, and expose him to the charge of quackery."


During the revolution he produced guns and bayonets for the Continental forces and had a seat in the state House of Commons 1778-1779. His service there actually began in 1758. At the close of the war he served as Treasurer of the Wilmington District and then was appointed in 1783 as Commissioner of Confiscated Property. He was radical about how the loyalists should be treated and how debt to Britain was to be handled. He wished to keep all the loyalist's confiscated properties and to tell England we owed them nothing. He wanted to continue punishing loyalists even after the war. He was considered ruthless. In 1786 North Carolina elected him to the Congress of the Confederation then he ran and won a seat 1788-1789.
At this time he returned to North Carolina to fight the ratification of the Constitution which to him meant the federal government would overwhelm the states. The state finally did ratify the Constitution when the Bill of Rights was sent to the states but he still fought it without any political consequences whatsoever. As a Democratic-Republican he was very popular. He was then elected to the US House of Representatives but then again returned to local politics in the North Carolina House of Representatives 1793-1794. He then ran and won a term in the United States Senate. After his term in the Senate he once again returned to public service at home as a Customs officer in Wilmington.

An interesting fellow to say the least. Preacher, teacher, gunsmith, blacksmith, tavern owner, slaver, radical anti-federalist and then member of the Federalist Constitution's Congress which he fought tooth and nail. A preacher who affirmed the government of the United States was not in any sense founded on the Christian religion.

Elijah Paine was Vermont's first United States Senator. He served from March 4, 1795 to September 1, 1801. As a young man he served in the Continental Army in 1776 and 1777 and then studied at Harvard, graduating with an A.B. in 1781. After studying at Harvard Law school he was admitted to the bar in 1784. While still a farmer, he practiced law in his home state. It was Paine that began the settlement in Williamstown and Paine who established a saw mill, a cloth factory and grist mill in Northfield, Vt. He served in the state constitution's convention of 1786 and then became a Probate Judge from 1788 to 1791. Concurrently, he served in the Vermont House of Representatives from 1787 to 1790. From 1791 to 1795 Paine was the Chief Justice of the Vermont Supreme Court. In his final year he was elected by the Vermont legislature to be the US Senator to represent the new State of Vermont. He was re-elected in 1801 but when nominated and confirmed by that same Senate, he took a judgeship on the US District Court in Vermont. There he remained for the next forty years, retiring just a month before his death.

Born at Hobcaw Plantation, Senator Jacob Read represented the State of South Caroline from March 4, 1795 to March 4, 1801. While in the Senate he served a short time in the Fifth Congress as Senate Pro tempore from November 22, 1797 to December 12, 1797. Growing up, he was educated in the classical liberal tradition, went on to study law and became a lawyer. In 1773 and 1774 he continued his law studies in England. As the conflict approached, Read joined other Americans in London who petitioned against British sanctions against the Boston Port. Returning to South Carolina he served in both civil and military positions during the war. As a prisoner of war, he spent 1780 and 1781 in St. Augustine. When the war ended he was free and soon thereafter was elected to the State Assembly and he also served in the Governor's Privy Council. Using his background and skills he was elected to the Congress of the Confederation for three terms in 1783, 1784, and 1785. His political career continued in the South Carolina House of Representatives where he was the Speaker of the House until he was elected as a Federalist to the US Senate. He lost his re-election bid to the Jeffersonian Democratic-Republican John Colhoun. He died on July 17, 1816 and was buried in the family plot at Hobcaw.

The United Senator for Georgia in the Fifth Congress was Josiah Tattnall. He served in the Senate from February 20, 1796 to March 4, 1799. Having a prep school's classical education he continued his studies at Eaton College in England when the revolutionary war broke out. It is possible his father was a loyalist because he slipped away in secret back to America and joined the Continental Army in 1782. Kids those days! Continuing in a military career, he was a soldier in the Georgia State Troops in 1793, promoted to Colonel in 1793. He must have been a skillful leader because he ran for and was elected for a term in the Georgia House of Representatives for the term of 1795-1796. Evidently an impressive man, he was elected by Georgia to represent them in the United States Senate. All this time he retained his military status and even was promoted to Brigadier General in 1801 when he was elected Governor of Georgia. At the same time, he was a wealthy planter and was able to retire to the West Indies where he died in 1803.

Connecticut's second US Senator was James Hillhouse and he served from December 6, 1796 to June 10, 1810. He was a staunch Federalist and while serving in the Jefferson years, opposed many of Jefferson's policies, including the Louisiana Purchase. Growing up in the New Haven area, he attended what is now the nation's third oldest educational facility, the Hopkins School. A prep school, Hopkins' classical liberal education readied Hillhouse for his college education at Yale, where he ended up studying law and was admitted to the bar in 1775. After graduation, Hillhouse began his practice in New Haven but when the revolution began he joined the war effort. As a Captain in the Governor's Foot Guards, he fought the British when they invaded New Haven. From his military leadership he then served in the Connecticut House of Representatives from 1780 to 1785. The years of 1789 and 1790 found him in the State Council. An man of impressive strengths, he was chosen to serve in the Congress of the Confederation but never attended a session. He then served in the Second, Third, and Fourth Congress of the United States in the US House of Representatives. Due to a resignation an election was held and he won the US Senate seat. A strong leader, he was President Pro Temp of the Senate during the Sixth Congress of the United States. Although he believed the Government of the United States was not in any sense founded on the Christian Religion, he held a deep resentment for Jefferson and suggested Connecticut's secession from the Union. Hillhouse resigned his seat in 1810.

The Massachusetts Senator Benjamin Goodhue was a fierce Hamiltonian Federalist who served in the Senate from June 11, 1796 to November 8, 1800. Educated at Harvard, he became a wealthy merchant and also entered the political arena just as John Langdon of NH did. His career seems to have started with a bang as he was chosen as a delegate to the state's constitutional convention in 1779 and 1780. He then served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives for three terms. In 1783 and 1786 through 1788 he served in the State Senate. After the ratification of the Federal Constitution, he was elected to the US House of Representatives, serving from March 4, 1789 to June of 1796. During the Fourth Congress he was the Chairman of the Committee on Commerce and Manufactures. He then progressed to the US Senate, filling ma vacancy due to the resignation of George Cabot. In these days, the state legislatures elected their state's Senators so one had to be highly esteemed by the legislature, not the constituents.

Senator Goodhue had a radical streak in him; he was part of the Essex Junto. This was a pro-Hamilton, anti-Jefferson coalition that sought to secede and form a northeastern Confederacy based in New England. They were so against Jefferson's second revolution and displacement of all things federalist that they sought radical solutions. 23 Massachusetts' other Senator was the Federalist, Theodore Sedgwick. He served from June 11, 1796 to March 4, 1799. His initial education was at Yale where he studied law and theology but he left Yale to devote his studies solely to law in the office of Colonel Mark Hopkins, French and Indian War hero and Great Barrington's first lawyer (1761). Sedgwick was admitted to the Bar in 1766 and began his practice in Great Barrington but moved to Sheffield. His career was interrupted by the Revolutionary war so he joined the Continental Army, and served as a Major.

At the time Sedgwick entered the political arena as a legislative representative, his career involved one of the most famous freedom suites in the history of the nation. Known at the time as Brom & Bett v. J. Ashley Esq., two slaves sued for their freedom based on the Massachusetts Constitution which declared all men are born free and equal. The slaves won as did another at the Supreme Court level in a different case (Caldwell v. Jennison) so slavery was just about dead in Massachusetts after the courts sided with the slaves on Constitutional grounds. See The Slave Who Sued For Freedom.

Sedgwick was first elected to the Massachusetts House of Representatives in 1780 and served there or in the State Senate until 1788. During this time has was also a delegate to the Congress of the Confederation during 1785, 1786, and 1788. At the time he was also elected to represent his constituents at the Massachusetts convention to consider the adoption of the Federal Constitution. Sedgwick went on to serve in the US House of Representatives from March 4, 1789 to June 1796. He then resigned and was elected by the Massachusetts legislature to fill the seat vacated by Senator Caleb Strong, also a Massachusetts delegate and signer at the Philadelphia Convention of 1787. During his term he also served for a time as the Senate's President Pro Tempore in 1798. After the end of his Senatorial term, Sedgwick went back to the US House of Representatives where he served as Speaker of the House. The day his term ended in the Senate, his term began in the House. In 1802, he was appointed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts where he served until the time of his death in 1813.

Massachusetts was first state to ban slavery, rule against laws banning interracial marriage in 1843, and to legalize gay marriage. Were are ALL born free and equal and Massachusetts walks the talk. Massachusetts is the home of the free.

Tennessee became the 16th State on June 1, 1796. Its first two US Senators were William Blount and William Cocke. Both were Democratic-Republicans and they were sworn in on August 2nd of that year. Born of a wealthy merchant/planter family in North Carolina, Blount was raised as a member of the Presbyterian Church. He received a classical liberal education by way of private tutoring in New Bern, a town settled by Swiss Immigrants which became the state's first capital after the revolution. Blount served as a paymaster in the Continental Army and went on to become chief paymaster of North Carolina's armed forces. He is also credited with organizing local militias on short notice and to fight with them. Afterward he served in the state's House of Commons from 1780 to 1784. At the same time he was elected as a delegate to the Congress of the Confederation in 1782, 1783, 1786, and 1787. Blount is one of the framers of the Constitution.

In 1787 Blount attended the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia as a delegate for North Carolina; in the famous picture of the convention, Blount is the next person in line to sign the document. Blount was then a major proponent of the Constitution in North Carolina's ratification convention. From there, he went to the State Senate until 1790 when he was nominated by the President Washington and confirmed by the Senate to serve as Governor of the Southwest Territories. These are the lands that North Carolina ceded which would soon become the State of Tennessee. Blount was at the same time appointed head of the region's Indian Affairs department. Four major tribes inhabited the territory; the Cherokees, the Creeks, the Choctaws, and the Chickasaws. Blount led Tennessee to Statehood, served as chairman of Tennessee's first constitutional convention and then became one of Tennessee's first two US Senators. That didn't last.

Blount was an adventurer, an expansionist, and a land speculator and was caught in an alleged plot with a British agent to use Indians to undermine Spain's control of western Florida, Louisiana, and the Mississippi River. He was expelled from the Senate on July 8, 1797 for "a high misdemeanor, entirely inconsistent with his public trust and duty as a Senator". It was never proven but it is noteworthy that the Southwest territory that became Tennessee bordered the Mississippi so Blount was indeed a leader who might act against any hindrances to his visions, national or economic. Only a bump in the road to Tennesseans, Blount was elected - during his trial - to the Tennessee Senate where he served as its speaker and President until his death in 1800. Now that's gratitude!

Tennessee's other Senator, William Cocke, was a Democratic-Republican who served from August 2, 1796 to September 26, 1797, when Andrew Jackson was elected by Tennessee to fill the seat. He also served in the other Senate Seat from March 4, 1799 to March 4, 1805. Born in Virginia, Cocke received a classical liberal education before studying law. More of a frontiersman than a lawyer, his law practice was minimal because he preferred the adventures of the new frontier. In fact, he worked with Daniel Boone in exploring and setting the foundation for the statehood of Kentucky and Tennessee. One of his projects was the statehood of Franklin, a small region in eastern Tennessee. Before moving to Tennessee, Cocke was elected to the Virginia House of Burgesses and also served as a colonel in the militia. Cocke is known for successfully defeating hostile Indian raids.

When Tennessee joined the Union, Cocke joined Blount in framing Tennessee's first Constitution in the convention of 1796. After his second term in the US Senate, Cocke was appointed a judge in the First Circuit Court of the United States. During the War of 1812, Cocke joined his Tennesseean comrade in arms, Andrew Jackson. Forever an adventurer even at his age of 64, Cocke then moved to Mississippi where he was again elected to a legislature in 1813. Noting his vast experience in the frontier and with Indians, President James Madison appointed Cocke as Indian Agent for the Chickasaws Nation. Sadly, these same people would be driven west to designated Indian lands by the Indian Removal policies of Andrew Jackson which were set in place years before his Presidency. The Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall ruled his ethnic cleansing order unconstitutional but Jackson defied the court, allegedly stating, "let him enforce it". Cocke's religion is unknown.

Senator Uriah Tracy was Connecticut's senior Senator at the time. As a Federalist, he served from October 13, 1796 until his death on July 19, 1807. After a classical liberal education he entered Yale where he studied law. After being admitted to the bar in 1781, Tracy moved to northwest Connecticut where he served as the Litchfield County Attorney. Having served in the Continental Army during the revolution, he remained a Major General in the state militia.

Tracy's legislative career began with his election to the state legislature in 1788 where he served until 1793, when he was the speaker of that body. He was then elected to the US House of Representatives where he served from April 8, 1793 to October 13, 1796. At that time, Connecticut's US Senator Jonathan Trumbull resigned, so Tracy was elected to replace him. Tracy later became President Pro Temnpore of the Senate during the Sixth Congress. After the Presidential election of 1800, Tracy joined with those New Englanders that strongly opposed President Jefferson's policies, including the Louisiana Purchase. The Purchase, these New Englanders feared, would further diminish the power of the north. His religion is unknown. He was the first member of Congress buried at the Congressional Cemetery.

Isaac Tichenor was the Senator for Vermont from October 18, 1796 until he resigned October 17, 1797 after being elected Governor of Vermont. Being born in New Jersey, Tichenor received a classical liberal education before entering the College of New Jersey (Princeton). Following his years at Princeton, he studied law in Schenectady, NY. His life of public service began in that region of upstate New York when he was appointed Assistant Commissary General in 1777. After being stationed in Bennington, Vt, he moved there and began is law practice. Falling in love with Vermont, he entered local politics and served in the State House of representatives from 1781 to 1785, being its speaker in 1783 and 1784. At the same time, Tichenor was Vermont's agent to the Congress of the Confederation and point-man making Vermont's case for statehood. The next five years he served as State Councilor and then was appointed an associate justice of the Vermont Supreme Court where he served until 1794 when he became Chief Justice until 1796. After his year in the US Senate, Tichenor served as Governor of Vermont for all but one year until 1809. After being defeated in the gubernatorial race of 1809 it seems as if Tichenor took a break from politics. The great statesman from Vermont was not finished, though. Running for the US Senate, he was elected and served from March 4, 1815 to March 3, 1821. Afterward, he returned to his law practice in Bennington.
Most of Vermont's politicians were Democratic-Republicans but Tichenor was a successful Federalist. He was beaten several times by Democrati- Republicans over the decades but he always came back. His religion is unknown.

Tuesday, August 30, 2011

THE BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF MORALITY by Edward O Wilson


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The Biological Basis of Morality by Edward O. Wilson

THE BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF MORALITY by Edward O Wilson
This article, which is based on the book CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE, can be found HERE.



"Do we invent our moral absolutes in order to make society workable? Or are these enduring principles expressed to us by some transcendent or Godlike authority? Efforts to resolve this conundrum have perplexed, sometimes inflamed, our best minds for centuries, but the natural sciences are telling us more and more about the choices we make and our reasons for making them."
Edward O. Wilson is the Pellegrino University Research Professor and Honorary Curator in Entomology at Harvard University. His article in this issue is drawn from his book Consilience.
CENTURIES of debate on the origin of ethics come down to this: Either ethical principles, such as justice and human rights, are independent of human experience, or they are human inventions. The distinction is more than an exercise for academic philosophers. The choice between these two understandings makes all the difference in the way we view ourselves as a species. It measures the authority of religion, and it determines the conduct of moral reasoning.
The two assumptions in competition are like islands in a sea of chaos, as different as life and death, matter and the void. One cannot learn which is correct by pure logic; the answer will eventually be reached through an accumulation of objective evidence. Moral reasoning, I believe, is at every level intrinsically consilient with -- compatible with, intertwined with -- the natural sciences. (I use a form of the word "consilience" -- literally a "jumping together" of knowledge as a result of the linking of facts and fact-based theory across disciplines to create a common groundwork of explanation -- because its rarity has preserved its precision.)
Every thoughtful person has an opinion on which premise is correct. But the split is not, as popularly supposed, between religious believers and secularists. It is between transcendentalists, who think that moral guidelines exist outside the human mind, and empiricists, who think them contrivances of the mind. In simplest terms, the options are as follows: I believe in the independence of moral values, whether from God or not, and I believe that moral values come from human beings alone, whether or not God exists.
Theologians and philosophers have almost always focused on transcendentalism as the means to validate ethics. They seek the grail of natural law, which comprises freestanding principles of moral conduct immune to doubt and compromise. Christian theologians, following Saint Thomas Aquinas's reasoning in Summa Theologiae, by and large consider natural law to be an expression of God's will. In this view, human beings have an obligation to discover the law by diligent reasoning and to weave it into the routine of their daily lives. Secular philosophers of a transcendental bent may seem to be radically different from theologians, but they are actually quite similar, at least in moral reasoning. They tend to view natural law as a set of principles so powerful, whatever their origin, as to be self-evident to any rational person. In short, transcendental views are fundamentally the same whether God is invoked or not.
For example, when Thomas Jefferson, following John Locke, derived the doctrine of natural rights from natural law, he was more concerned with the power of transcendental statements than with their origin, divine or secular. In the Declaration of Independence he blended secular and religious presumptions in one transcendentalist sentence, thus deftly covering all bets: "We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness." That assertion became the cardinal premise of America's civil religion, the righteous sword wielded by Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King Jr., and it endures as the central ethic binding together the diverse peoples of the United States.
So compelling are such fruits of natural-law theory, especially when the Deity is also invoked, that they may seem to place the transcendentalist assumption beyond question. But to its noble successes must be added appalling failures. It has been perverted many times in the past -- used, for example, to argue passionately for colonial conquest, slavery, and genocide. Nor was any great war ever fought without each side thinking its cause transcendentally sacred in some manner or other.
So perhaps we need to take empiricism more seriously. In the empiricist view, ethics is conduct favored consistently enough throughout a society to be expressed as a code of principles. It reaches its precise form in each culture according to historical circumstance. The codes, whether adjudged good or evil by outsiders, play an important role in determining which cultures flourish and which decline.
The crux of the empiricist view is its emphasis on objective knowledge. Because the success of an ethical code depends on how wisely it interprets moral sentiments, those who frame one should know how the brain works, and how the mind develops. The success of ethics also depends on how accurately a society can predict the consequences of particular actions as opposed to others, especially in cases of moral ambiguity.
The empiricist argument holds that if we explore the biological roots of moral behavior, and explain their material origins and biases, we should be able to fashion a wise and enduring ethical consensus. The current expansion of scientific inquiry into the deeper processes of human thought makes this venture feasible.
The choice between transcendentalism and empiricism will be the coming century's version of the struggle for men's souls. Moral reasoning will either remain centered in idioms of theology and philosophy, where it is now, or shift toward science-based material analysis. Where it settles will depend on which world view is proved correct, or at least which is more widely perceived to be correct.
Ethicists, scholars who specialize in moral reasoning, tend not to declare themselves on the foundations of ethics, or to admit fallibility. Rarely do we see an argument that opens with the simple statement This is my starting point, and it could be wrong. Ethicists instead favor a fretful passage from the particular to the ambiguous, or the reverse -- vagueness into hard cases. I suspect that almost all are transcendentalists at heart, but they rarely say so in simple declarative sentences. One cannot blame them very much; explaining the ineffable is difficult.
I am an empiricist. On religion I lean toward deism, but consider its proof largely a problem in astrophysics. The existence of a God who created the universe (as envisioned by deism) is possible, and the question may eventually be settled, perhaps by forms of material evidence not yet imagined. Or the matter may be forever beyond human reach. In contrast, and of far greater importance to humanity, the idea of a biological God, one who directs organic evolution and intervenes in human affairs (as envisioned by theism), is increasingly contravened by biology and the brain sciences.
The same evidence, I believe, favors a purely material origin of ethics, and it meets the criterion of consilience: causal explanations of brain activity and evolution, while imperfect, already cover most facts known about behavior we term "moral." Although this conception is relativistic (in other words, dependent on personal viewpoint), it can, if evolved carefully, lead more directly and safely to stable moral codes than can transcendentalism, which is also, when one thinks about it, ultimately relativistic.
Of course, lest I forget, I may be wrong.
Transcendentalism Versus Empiricism
THE argument of the empiricist has roots that go back to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and, in the beginning of the modern era, to David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740). The first clear evolutionary elaboration of it was by Charles Darwin, in The Descent of Man (1871).
Again, religious transcendentalism is bolstered by secular transcendentalism, to which it is fundamentally similar. Immanuel Kant, judged by history the greatest of secular philosophers, addressed moral reasoning very much as a theologian. Human beings, he argued, are independent moral agents with a wholly free will, capable of obeying or breaking moral law: "There is in man a power of self-determination, independent of any coercion through sensuous impulses." Our minds are subject to a categorical imperative, Kant said, of what our actions ought to be. The imperative is a good in itself alone, apart from all other considerations, and it can be recognized by this rule: "Act only on that maxim you wish will become a universal law." Most important, and transcendental, ought has no place in nature. Nature, Kant said, is a system of cause and effect, whereas moral choice is a matter of free will, absent cause and effect. In making moral choices, in rising above mere instinct, human beings transcend the realm of nature and enter a realm of freedom that belongs exclusively to them as rational creatures.
Now, this formulation has a comforting feel to it, but it makes no sense at all in terms of either material or imaginable entities, which is why Kant, even apart from his tortured prose, is so hard to understand. Sometimes a concept is baffling not because it is profound but because it is wrong. This idea does not accord, we know now, with the evidence of how the brain works.
In Principia Ethica (1903), G. E. Moore, the founder of modern ethical philosophy, essentially agreed with Kant. In his view, moral reasoning cannot dip into psychology and the social sciences in order to locate ethical principles, because those disciplines yield only a causal picture and fail to illuminate the basis of moral justification. So to reach the normative ought by way of the factual is is to commit a basic error of logic, which Moore called the naturalistic fallacy. John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice (1971), once again traveled the transcendental road. He offered the very plausible suggestion that justice be defined as fairness, which is to be accepted as an intrinsic good. It is the imperative we would follow if we had no starting information about our own future status in life. But in making such a suggestion Rawls ventured no thought on where the human brain comes from or how it works. He offered no evidence that justice-as-fairness is consistent with human nature, hence practicable as a blanket premise. Probably it is, but how can we know except by blind trial and error?
Had Kant, Moore, and Rawls known modern biology and experimental psychology, they might well not have reasoned as they did. Yet as this century closes, transcendentalism remains firm in the hearts not just of religious believers but also of countless scholars in the social sciences and the humanities who, like Moore and Rawls, have chosen to insulate their thinking from the natural sciences.
Many philosophers will respond by saying, Ethicists don't need that kind of information. You really can't pass from is to ought. You can't describe a genetic predisposition and suppose that because it is part of human nature, it is somehow transformed into an ethical precept. We must put moral reasoning in a special category, and use transcendental guidelines as required.
No, we do not have to put moral reasoning in a special category and use transcendental premises, because the posing of the naturalistic fallacy is itself a fallacy. For if ought is not is, what is? To translate is into ought makes sense if we attend to the objective meaning of ethical precepts. They are very unlikely to be ethereal messages awaiting revelation, or independent truths vibrating in a nonmaterial dimension of the mind. They are more likely to be products of the brain and the culture. From the consilient perspective of the natural sciences, they are no more than principles of the social contract hardened into rules and dictates -- the behavioral codes that members of a society fervently wish others to follow and are themselves willing to accept for the common good. Precepts are the extreme on a scale of agreements that range from casual assent, to public sentiment, to law, to that part of the canon considered sacred and unalterable. The scale applied to adultery might read as follows:
Let's not go further; it doesn't feel right, and it may lead to trouble. (Maybe we ought not.)
Adultery not only causes feelings of guilt but is generally disapproved of by society. (We probably ought not.)
Adultery isn't just disapproved of; it's against the law. (We almost certainly ought not.)
God commands that we avoid this mortal sin. (We absolutely ought not.)
In transcendental thinking, the chain of causation runs downward from the given ought in religion or natural law through jurisprudence to education and finally to individual choice. The argument from transcendentalism takes the following general form:
The order of nature contains supreme principles, either divine or intrinsic, and we will be wise to learn about them and find the means to conform to them. Thus John Rawls opens A Theory of Justice with a proposition he regards as irrevocable: "In a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests." As many critiques have made clear, that premise can lead to unhappy consequences when applied to the real world, including a tightening of social control and a decline in personal initiative. A very different premise, therefore, is suggested by Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974): "Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights). So strong and far-reaching are these rights that they raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials may do." Rawls would point us toward egalitarianism regulated by the state, Nozick toward libertarianism in a minimalist state.
The empiricist view, in contrast, searching for an origin of ethical reasoning that can be objectively studied, reverses the chain of causation. The individual is seen as predisposed biologically to make certain choices. Through cultural evolution some of the choices are hardened into precepts, then into laws, and, if the predisposition or coercion is strong enough, into a belief in the command of God or the natural order of the universe. The general empiricist principle takes this form: Strong innate feeling and historical experience cause certain actions to be preferred; we have experienced them, and have weighed their consequences, and agree to conform with codes that express them. Let us take an oath upon the codes, invest our personal honor in them, and suffer punishment for their violation. The empiricist view concedes that moral codes are devised to conform to some drives of human nature and to suppress others. Ought is the translation not of human nature but of the public will, which can be made increasingly wise and stable through an understanding of the needs and pitfalls of human nature. The empiricist view recognizes that the strength of commitment can wane as a result of new knowledge and experience, with the result that certain rules may be desacralized, old laws rescinded, and formerly prohibited behavior set free. It also recognizes that for the same reason new moral codes may need to be devised, with the potential of being made sacred in time.
The Origin of Moral Instincts
IF the empiricist world view is correct, ought is just shorthand for one kind of factual statement, a word that denotes what society first chose (or was coerced) to do, and then codified. The naturalistic fallacy is thereby reduced to the naturalistic problem. The solution of the problem is not difficult: ought is the product of a material process. The solution points the way to an objective grasp of the origin of ethics.
A few investigators are now embarked on just such a foundational inquiry. Most agree that ethical codes have arisen by evolution through the interplay of biology and culture. In a sense these investigators are reviving the idea of moral sentiments that was developed in the eighteenth century by the British empiricists Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith.
What have been thought of as moral sentiments are now taken to mean moral instincts (as defined by the modern behavioral sciences), subject to judgment according to their consequences. Such sentiments are thus derived from epigenetic rules -- hereditary biases in mental development, usually conditioned by emotion, that influence concepts and decisions made from them. The primary origin of moral instincts is the dynamic relation between cooperation and defection. The essential ingredient for the molding of the instincts during genetic evolution in any species is intelligence high enough to judge and manipulate the tension generated by the dynamism. That level of intelligence allows the building of complex mental scenarios well into the future. It occurs, so far as is known, only in human beings and perhaps their closest relatives among the higher apes.
A way of envisioning the hypothetical earliest stages of moral evolution is provided by game theory, particularly the solutions to the famous Prisoner's Dilemma. Consider the following typical scenario of the dilemma. Two gang members have been arrested for murder and are being questioned separately. The evidence against them is strong but not irrefutable. The first gang member believes that if he turns state's witness, he will be granted immunity and his partner will be sentenced to life in prison. But he is also aware that his partner has the same option, and that if both of them exercise it, neither will be granted immunity. That is the dilemma. Will the two gang members independently defect, so that both take the hard fall? They will not, because they agreed in advance to remain silent if caught. By doing so, both hope to be convicted on a lesser charge or escape punishment altogether. Criminal gangs have turned this principle of calculation into an ethical precept: Never rat on another member; always be a stand-up guy. Honor does exist among thieves. The gang is a society of sorts; its code is the same as that of a captive soldier in wartime, obliged to give only name, rank, and serial number.
In one form or another, comparable dilemmas that are solvable by cooperation occur constantly and everywhere in daily life. The payoff is variously money, status, power, sex, access, comfort, or health. Most of these proximate rewards are converted into the universal bottom line of Darwinian genetic fitness: greater longevity and a secure, growing family. And so it has most likely always been. Imagine a Paleolithic band of five hunters. One considers breaking away from the others to look for an antelope on his own. If successful, he will gain a large quantity of meat and hide -- five times as much as if he stays with the band and they are successful. But he knows from experience that his chances of success are very low, much less than the chances of the band of five working together. In addition, whether successful alone or not, he will suffer animosity from the others for lessening their prospects. By custom the band members remain together and share equitably the animals they kill. So the hunter stays. He also observes good manners in doing so, especially if he is the one who makes the kill. Boastful pride is condemned, because it rips the delicate web of reciprocity.
Now suppose that human propensities to cooperate or defect are heritable: some people are innately more cooperative, others less so. In this respect moral aptitude would simply be like almost all other mental traits studied to date. Among traits with documented heritability, those closest to moral aptitude are empathy with the distress of others and certain processes of attachment between infants and their caregivers. To the heritability of moral aptitude add the abundant evidence of history that cooperative individuals generally survive longer and leave more offspring. Following that reasoning, in the course of evolutionary history genes predisposing people toward cooperative behavior would have come to predominate in the human population as a whole.
Such a process repeated through thousands of generations inevitably gave rise to moral sentiments. With the exception of psychopaths (if any truly exist), every person vividly experiences these instincts variously as conscience, self-respect, remorse, empathy, shame, humility, and moral outrage. They bias cultural evolution toward the conventions that express the universal moral codes of honor, patriotism, altruism, justice, compassion, mercy, and redemption.
The dark side of the inborn propensity to moral behavior is xenophobia. Because personal familiarity and common interest are vital in social transactions, moral sentiments evolved to be selective. People give trust to strangers with effort, and true compassion is a commodity in chronically short supply. Tribes cooperate only through carefully defined treaties and other conventions. They are quick to imagine themselves the victims of conspiracies by competing groups, and they are prone to dehumanize and murder their rivals during periods of severe conflict. They cement their own group loyalties by means of sacred symbols and ceremonies. Their mythologies are filled with epic victories over menacing enemies.
The complementary instincts of morality and tribalism are easily manipulated. Civilization has made them more so. Beginning about 10,000 years ago, a tick in geological time, when the agricultural revolution started in the Middle East, in China, and in Mesoamerica, populations increased tenfold in density over those of hunter-gatherer societies. Families settled on small plots of land, villages proliferated, and labor was finely divided as a growing minority of the populace specialized as craftsmen, traders, and soldiers. The rising agricultural societies became increasingly hierarchical. As chiefdoms and then states thrived on agricultural surpluses, hereditary rulers and priestly castes took power. The old ethical codes were transformed into coercive regulations, always to the advantage of the ruling classes. About this time the idea of law-giving gods originated. Their commands lent the ethical codes overpowering authority -- once again, no surprise, in the interests of the rulers.
Because of the technical difficulty of analyzing such phenomena in an objective manner, and because people resist biological explanations of their higher cortical functions in the first place, very little progress has been made in the biological exploration of the moral sentiments. Even so, it is astonishing that the study of ethics has advanced so little since the nineteenth century. The most distinguishing and vital qualities of the human species remain a blank space on the scientific map. I doubt that discussions of ethics should rest upon the freestanding assumptions of contemporary philosophers who have evidently never given thought to the evolutionary origin and material functioning of the human brain. In no other domain of the humanities is a union with the natural sciences more urgently needed.
When the ethical dimension of human nature is at last fully opened to such exploration, the innate epigenetic rules of moral reasoning will probably not prove to be aggregated into simple instincts such as bonding, cooperativeness, and altruism. Instead the rules will most probably turn out to be an ensemble of many algorithms, whose interlocking activities guide the mind across a landscape of nuanced moods and choices.
Such a prestructured mental world may at first seem too complicated to have been created by autonomous genetic evolution alone. But all the evidence of biology suggests that just this process was enough to spawn the millions of species of life surrounding us. Each kind of animal is furthermore guided through its life cycle by unique and often elaborate sets of instinctual algorithms, many of which are beginning to yield to genetic and neurobiological analyses. With all these examples before us, we may reasonably conclude that human behavior originated the same way.
A Scientific Approach to Moral Reasoning
MEANWHILE, the mélanges of moral reasoning employed by modern societies are, to put the matter simply, a mess. They are chimeras, composed of odd parts stuck together. Paleolithic egalitarian and tribalistic instincts are still firmly installed. As part of the genetic foundation of human nature, they cannot be replaced. In some cases, such as quick hostility to strangers and competing groups, they have become generally ill adapted and persistently dangerous. Above the fundamental instincts rise superstructures of arguments and rules that accommodate the novel institutions created by cultural evolution. These accommodations, which reflect the attempt to maintain order and further tribal interests, have been too volatile to track by genetic evolution; they are not yet in the genes.
Little wonder, then, that ethics is the most publicly contested of all philosophical enterprises. Or that political science, which at its foundation is primarily the study of applied ethics, is so frequently problematic. Neither is informed by anything that would be recognizable as authentic theory in the natural sciences. Both ethics and political science lack a foundation of verifiable knowledge of human nature sufficient to produce cause-and-effect predictions and sound judgments based on them. Surely closer attention must be paid to the deep springs of ethical behavior. The greatest void in knowledge for such a venture is the biology of moral sentiments. In time this subject can be understood, I believe, by paying attention to the following topics:
* The definition of moral sentiments, first by precise descriptions from experimental psychology and then by analysis of the underlying neural and endocrine responses.
* The genetics of moral sentiments, most easily approached through measurements of the heritability of the psychological and physiological processes of ethical behavior, and eventually, with difficulty, through identification of the prescribing genes.
* The development of moral sentiments as products of the interactions of genes and the environment. Research is most effective when conducted at two levels: the histories of ethical systems as part of the emergence of different cultures, and the cognitive development of individuals living in a variety of cultures. Such investigations are already well along in anthropology and psychology. In the future they will be augmented by contributions from biology.
* The deep history of moral sentiments -- why they exist in the first place. Presumably they contributed to survival and reproductive success during the long periods of prehistoric time in which they genetically evolved.
From a convergence of these several approaches the true origin and meaning of ethical behavior may come into focus. If so, a more certain measure can then be taken of the strength and flexibility of the epigenetic rules composing the various moral sentiments. From that knowledge it should be possible to adapt ancient moral sentiments more wisely to the swiftly changing conditions of modern life into which, willy-nilly and largely in ignorance, we have plunged.
Then new answers might be found to the truly important questions of moral reasoning. How can the moral instincts be ranked? Which are best subdued and to what degree? Which should be validated by law and symbol? How can precepts be left open to appeal under extraordinary circumstances? In the new understanding can be located the most effective means for reaching consensus. No one can guess the exact form that agreements will take from one culture to the next. The process, however, can be predicted with assurance. It will be democratic, weakening the clash of rival religions and ideologies. History is moving decisively in that direction, and people are by nature too bright and too contentious to abide anything else. And the pace can be confidently predicted: change will come slowly, across generations, because old beliefs die hard, even when they are demonstrably false.
The Origins of Religion
THE same reasoning that aligns ethical philosophy with science can also inform the study of religion. Religions are analogous to organisms. They have a life cycle. They are born, they grow, they compete, they reproduce, and, in the fullness of time, most die. In each of these phases religions reflect the human organisms that nourish them. They express a primary rule of human existence: Whatever is necessary to sustain life is also ultimately biological.
Successful religions typically begin as cults, which then increase in power and inclusiveness until they achieve tolerance outside the circle of believers. At the core of each religion is a creation myth, which explains how the world began and how the chosen people -- those subscribing to the belief system -- arrived at its center. Often a mystery, a set of secret instructions and formulas, is available to members who have worked their way to a higher state of enlightenment. The medieval Jewish cabala, the trigradal system of Freemasonry, and the carvings on Australian aboriginal spirit sticks are examples of such arcana. Power radiates from the center, gathering converts and binding followers to the group. Sacred places are designated, where the gods can be importuned, rites observed, and miracles witnessed.
The devotees of the religion compete as a tribe with those of other religions. They harshly resist the dismissal of their beliefs by rivals. They venerate self-sacrifice in defense of the religion.
The tribalistic roots of religion are similar to those of moral reasoning and may be identical. Religious rites, such as burial ceremonies, are very old. It appears that in the late Paleolithic period in Europe and the Middle East bodies were sometimes placed in shallow graves, accompanied by ocher or blossoms; one can easily imagine such ceremonies performed to invoke spirits and gods. But, as theoretical deduction and the evidence suggest, the primitive elements of moral behavior are far older than Paleolithic ritual. Religion arose on a foundation of ethics, and it has probably always been used in one manner or another to justify moral codes.
The formidable influence of the religious drive is based on far more, however, than just the validation of morals. A great subterranean river of the mind, it gathers strength from a broad spread of tributary emotions. Foremost among them is the survival instinct. "Fear," as the Roman poet Lucretius said, "was the first thing on earth to make the gods." Our conscious minds hunger for a permanent existence. If we cannot have everlasting life of the body, then absorption into some immortal whole will serve. Anything will serve, as long as it gives the individual meaning and somehow stretches into eternity that swift passage of the mind and spirit lamented by Saint Augustine as the short day of time.
The understanding and control of life is another source of religious power. Doctrine draws on the same creative springs as science and the arts, its aim being the extraction of order from the mysteries and tumult of the material world. To explain the meaning of life it spins mythic narratives of the tribal history, populating the cosmos with protective spirits and gods. The existence of the supernatural, if accepted, testifies to the existence of that other world so desperately desired.
Religion is also mightily empowered by its principal ally, tribalism. The shamans and priests implore us, in somber cadence, Trust in the sacred rituals, become part of the immortal force, you are one of us. As your life unfolds, each step has mystic significance that we who love you will mark with a solemn rite of passage, the last to be performed when you enter that second world, free of pain and fear.
If the religious mythos did not exist in a culture, it would quickly be invented, and in fact it has been invented everywhere, thousands of times through history. Such inevitability is the mark of instinctual behavior in any species, which is guided toward certain states by emotion-driven rules of mental development. To call religion instinctive is not to suppose that any particular part of its mythos is untrue -- only that its sources run deeper than ordinary habit and are in fact hereditary, urged into existence through biases in mental development that are encoded in the genes.
Such biases are a predictable consequence of the brain's genetic evolution. The logic applies to religious behavior, with the added twist of tribalism. There is a hereditary selective advantage to membership in a powerful group united by devout belief and purpose. Even when individuals subordinate themselves and risk death in a common cause, their genes are more likely to be transmitted to the next generation than are those of competing groups who lack comparable resolve.
The mathematical models of population genetics suggest the following rule in the evolutionary origin of such altruism: If the reduction in survival and reproduction of individuals owing to genes for altruism is more than offset by the increased probability of survival of the group owing to the altruism, then altruism genes will rise in frequency throughout the entire population of competing groups. To put it as concisely as possible: the individual pays, his genes and tribe gain, altruism spreads.
Ethics and Animal Life
LET me now suggest a still deeper significance of the empiricist theory of the origin of ethics and religion. If empiricism were disproved, and transcendentalism compellingly upheld, the discovery would be quite simply the most consequential in human history. That is the burden laid upon biology as it draws close to the humanities.
The matter is still far from resolved. But empiricism, as I have argued, is well supported thus far in the case of ethics. The objective evidence for or against it in religion is weaker, but at least still consistent with biology. For example, the emotions that accompany religious ecstasy clearly have a neurobiological source. At least one form of brain disorder is associated with hyperreligiosity, in which cosmic significance is given to almost everything, including trivial everyday events. One can imagine the biological construction of a mind with religious beliefs, although that alone would not disprove the logic of transcendentalism, or prove the beliefs themselves to be untrue.
Equally important, much if not all religious behavior could have arisen from evolution by natural selection. The theory fits -- crudely. The behavior includes at least some aspects of belief in gods. Propitiation and sacrifice, which are near-universals of religious practice, are acts of submission to a dominant being. They reflect one kind of dominance hierarchy, which is a general trait of organized mammalian societies. Like human beings, animals use elaborate signals to advertise and maintain their rank in the hierarchy. The details vary among species but also have consistent similarities across the board, as the following two examples will illustrate.
In packs of wolves the dominant animal walks erect and "proud," stiff-legged and deliberate, with head, tail, and ears up, and stares freely and casually at others. In the presence of rivals the dominant animal bristles its pelt while curling its lips to show teeth, and it takes first choice in food and space. A subordinate uses opposite signals. It turns away from the dominant individual while lowering its head, ears, and tail, and it keeps its fur sleek and its teeth covered. It grovels and slinks, and yields food and space when challenged.
In a troop of rhesus monkeys the alpha male is remarkably similar in mannerisms to a dominant wolf. He keeps his head and tail up, and walks in a deliberate, "regal" manner while casually staring at others. He climbs objects to maintain height above his rivals. When challenged he stares hard at the opponent with mouth open -- signaling aggression, not surprise -- and sometimes slaps the ground with open palms to signal his readiness to attack. The male or female subordinate affects a furtive walk, holding its head and tail down, turning away from the alpha and other higher-ranked individuals. It keeps its mouth shut except for a fear grimace, and when challenged makes a cringing retreat. It yields space and food and, in the case of males, estrous females.
My point is this: Behavioral scientists from another planet would notice immediately the parallels between animal dominance behavior on the one hand and human obeisance to religious and civil authority on the other. They would point out that the most elaborate rites of obeisance are directed at the gods, the hyperdominant if invisible members of the human group. And they would conclude, correctly, that in baseline social behavior, not just in anatomy, Homo sapiens has only recently diverged in evolution from a nonhuman primate stock.
Countless studies of animal species, whose instinctive behavior is unobscured by cultural elaboration, have shown that membership in dominance orders pays off in survival and lifetime reproductive success. That is true not just for the dominant individuals but for the subordinates as well. Membership in either class gives animals better protection against enemies and better access to food, shelter, and mates than does solitary existence. Furthermore, subordination in the group is not necessarily permanent. Dominant individuals weaken and die, and as a result some of the underlings advance in rank and appropriate more resources.
Modern human beings are unlikely to have erased the old mammalian genetic programs and devised other means of distributing power. All the evidence suggests that they have not. True to their primate heritage, people are easily seduced by confident, charismatic leaders, especially males. That predisposition is strong in religious organizations. Cults form around such leaders. Their power grows if they can persuasively claim special access to the supremely dominant, typically male figure of God. As cults evolve into religions, the image of the Supreme Being is reinforced by myth and liturgy. In time the authority of the founders and their successors is graven in sacred texts. Unruly subordinates, known as "blasphemers," are squashed.
The symbol-forming human mind, however, never remains satisfied with raw, apish feeling in any emotional realm. It strives to build cultures that are maximally rewarding in every dimension. Ritual and prayer permit religious believers to be in direct touch with the Supreme Being; consolation from coreligionists softens otherwise unbearable grief; the unexplainable is explained; and an oceanic sense of communion with the larger whole is made possible.
Communion is the key, and hope rising from it is eternal; out of the dark night of the soul arises the prospect of a spiritual journey to the light. For a special few the journey can be taken in this life. The mind reflects in certain ways in order to reach ever higher levels of enlightenment, until finally, when no further progress is possible, it enters a mystical union with the whole. Within the great religions such enlightenment is expressed by Hindu samadhi, Buddhist Zen satori, Sufi fana, and Pentecostal Christian rebirth. Something like it is also experienced by hallucinating preliterate shamans. What all these celebrants evidently feel (as I felt once, to some degree, as a reborn evangelical) is hard to put in words, but Willa Cather came as close as possible in a single sentence. In My Antonia her fictional narrator says, "That is happiness; to be dissolved into something complete and great."
Of course that is happiness -- to find the godhead, or to enter the wholeness of nature, or otherwise to grasp and hold on to something ineffable, beautiful, and eternal. Millions seek it. They feel otherwise lost, adrift in a life without ultimate meaning. They enter established religions, succumb to cults, dabble in New Age nostrums. They push The Celestine Prophecy and other junk attempts at enlightenment onto the best-seller lists.
Perhaps, as I believe, these phenomena can all eventually be explained as functions of brain circuitry and deep genetic history. But this is not a subject that even the most hardened empiricist should presume to trivialize. The idea of mystical union is an authentic part of the human spirit. It has occupied humanity for millennia, and it raises questions of utmost seriousness for transcendentalists and scientists alike. What road, we ask, was traveled, what destination reached, by the mystics of history?
Theology Moves Toward Abstraction
FOR many, the urge to believe in transcendental existence and immortality is overpowering. Transcendentalism, especially when reinforced by religious faith, is psychically full and rich; it feels somehow right. By comparison, empiricism seems sterile and inadequate. In the quest for ultimate meaning the transcendentalist route is much easier to follow. That is why, even as empiricism is winning the mind, transcendentalism continues to win the heart. Science has always defeated religious dogma point by point when differences between the two were meticulously assessed. But to no avail. In the United States 16 million people belong to the Southern Baptist denomination, the largest favoring a literal interpretation of the Christian Bible, but the American Humanist Association, the leading organization devoted to secular and deistic humanism, has only 5,000 members.
Still, if history and science have taught us anything, it is that passion and desire are not the same as truth. The human mind evolved to believe in gods. It did not evolve to believe in biology. Acceptance of the supernatural conveyed a great advantage throughout prehistory, when the brain was evolving. Thus it is in sharp contrast to the science of biology, which was developed as a product of the modern age and is not underwritten by genetic algorithms. The uncomfortable truth is that the two beliefs are not factually compatible. As a result, those who hunger for both intellectual and religious truth face disquieting choices.
Meanwhile, theology tries to resolve the dilemma by evolving, sciencelike, toward abstraction. The gods of our ancestors were divine human beings. The Egyptians represented them as Egyptian (often with body parts of Nilotic animals), and the Greeks represented them as Greek. The great contribution of the Hebrews was to combine the entire pantheon into a single person, Yahweh (a patriarch appropriate to desert tribes), and to intellectualize his existence. No graven images were allowed. In the process, they rendered the divine presence less tangible. And so in biblical accounts it came to pass that no one, not even Moses approaching Yahweh in the burning bush, could look upon his face. In time the Jews were prohibited from even pronouncing his true full name. Nevertheless, the idea of a theistic God, omniscient, omnipotent, and closely involved in human affairs, has persisted to this day as the dominant religious image of Western culture.
During the Enlightenment a growing number of liberal Judeo-Christian theologians, wishing to accommodate theism to a more rationalist view of the material world, moved away from God as a literal person. Baruch Spinoza, the pre-eminent Jewish philosopher of the seventeenth century, visualized the deity as a transcendent substance present everywhere in the universe. Deus sive natura, "God or nature," he declared, they are interchangeable. For his philosophical pains he was banished from his synagogue under a comprehensive anathema, combining all the curses in the book. The risk of heresy notwithstanding, the depersonalization of God has continued steadily into the modern era. For Paul Tillich, one of the most influential Protestant theologians of the twentieth century, the assertion of the existence of God-as-person is not false; it is just meaningless. Among many of the most liberal contemporary thinkers the denial of a concrete divinity takes the form of "process theology." Everything in this most extreme of ontologies is part of a seamless and endlessly complex web of unfolding relationships. God is manifest in everything.
Scientists, the roving scouts of the empiricist movement, are not immune to the idea of God. Those who favor it often lean toward some form of process theology. They ask this question: When the real world of space, time, and matter is well enough known, will that knowledge reveal the Creator's presence?
Their hopes are vested in the theoretical physicists who pursue the final theory, the Theory of Everything, T.O.E., a system of interlocking equations that describe all that can be learned of the forces of the physical universe. T.O.E. is a "beautiful" theory, as Steven Weinberg has called it in his important book Dreams of a Final Theory -- beautiful because it will be elegant, expressing the possibility of unending complexity with minimal laws; and symmetrical, because it will hold invariant through all space and time; and inevitable, meaning that once it is stated, no part can be changed without invalidating the whole. All surviving subtheories can be fitted into it permanently, in the manner described by Einstein in his own contribution, the General Theory of Relativity. "The chief attraction of the theory," Einstein said, "lies in its logical completeness. If a single one of the conclusions drawn from it proves wrong, it must be given up; to modify it without destroying the whole structure seems to be impossible."
The prospect of a final theory by the most mathematical of scientists might seem to signal the approach of a new religious awakening. Stephen Hawking, yielding to the temptation in A Brief History of Time (1988), declared that this scientific achievement "would be the ultimate triumph of human reason -- for then we would know the mind of God."
A Hunger For Spirituality
THE essence of humanity's spiritual dilemma is that we evolved genetically to accept one truth and discovered another. Can we find a way to erase the dilemma, to resolve the contradictions between the transcendentalist and empiricist world views? Unfortunately, in my view, the answer is no. Furthermore, the choice between the two is unlikely to remain arbitrary forever. The assumptions underlying these world views are being tested with increasing severity by cumulative verifiable knowledge about how the universe works, from atom to brain to galaxy. In addition, the harsh lessons of history have taught us that one code of ethics is not always as good -- or at least not as durable -- as another. The same is true of religions. Some cosmologies are factually less correct than others, and some ethical precepts are less workable.
Human nature is biologically based, and it is relevant to ethics and religion. The evidence shows that because of its influence, people can readily be educated to only a narrow range of ethical precepts. They flourish within certain belief systems and wither in others. We need to know exactly why.
To that end I will be so presumptuous as to suggest how the conflict between the world views will most likely be settled. The idea of a genetic, evolutionary origin of moral and religious beliefs will continue to be tested by biological studies of complex human behavior. To the extent that the sensory and nervous systems appear to have evolved by natural selection, or at least some other purely material process, the empiricist interpretation will be supported. It will be further supported by verification of gene-culture coevolution, the essential process postulated by scientists to underlie human nature by linking changes in genes to changes in culture.
Now consider the alternative. To the extent that ethical and religious phenomena do not appear to have evolved in a manner congenial to biology, and especially to the extent that such complex behavior cannot be linked to physical events in the sensory and nervous systems, the empiricist position will have to be abandoned and a transcendentalist explanation accepted.
For centuries the writ of empiricism has been spreading into the ancient domain of transcendentalist belief, slowly at the start but quickening in the scientific age. The spirits our ancestors knew intimately fled first the rocks and trees and then the distant mountains. Now they are in the stars, where their final extinction is possible. But we cannot live without them. People need a sacred narrative. They must have a sense of larger purpose, in one form or another, however intellectualized. They will refuse to yield to the despair of animal mortality. They will continue to plead, in company with the psalmist, Now Lord, what is my comfort? They will find a way to keep the ancestral spirits alive.
If the sacred narrative cannot be in the form of a religious cosmology, it will be taken from the material history of the universe and the human species. That trend is in no way debasing. The true evolutionary epic, retold as poetry, is as intrinsically ennobling as any religious epic. Material reality discovered by science already possesses more content and grandeur than all religious cosmologies combined. The continuity of the human line has been traced through a period of deep history a thousand times as old as that conceived by the Western religions. Its study has brought new revelations of great moral importance. It has made us realize that Homo sapiens is far more than an assortment of tribes and races. We are a single gene pool from which individuals are drawn in each generation and into which they are dissolved the next generation, forever united as a species by heritage and a common future. Such are the conceptions, based on fact, from which new intimations of immortality can be drawn and a new mythos evolved.
Which world view prevails, religious transcendentalism or scientific empiricism, will make a great difference in the way humanity claims the future. While the matter is under advisement, an accommodation can be reached if the following overriding facts are realized. Ethics and religion are still too complex for present-day science to explain in depth. They are, however, far more a product of autonomous evolution than has hitherto been conceded by most theologians. Science faces in ethics and religion its most interesting and possibly most humbling challenge, while religion must somehow find the way to incorporate the discoveries of science in order to retain credibility. Religion will possess strength to the extent that it codifies and puts into enduring, poetic form the highest values of humanity consistent with empirical knowledge. That is the only way to provide compelling moral leadership. Blind faith, no matter how passionately expressed, will not suffice. Science, for its part, will test relentlessly every assumption about the human condition and in time uncover the bedrock of moral and religious sentiments.
The eventual result of the competition between the two world views, I believe, will be the secularization of the human epic and of religion itself. However the process plays out, it demands open discussion and unwavering intellectual rigor in an atmosphere of mutual respect.